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Abstract 
Just what’s China up to at sea? To casual observers, including a burgeoning legion of journalists, 
commentators and bloggers, China seems set on a path to becoming a major force on the world’s 
oceans, developing bluewater naval power with which to protect the Chinese state’s expanding economic 
ties to far-flung corners of the world and project political and even strategic influence. Such observers 
rightly note the rapid growth in China’s international seaborne trade, its shipping and shipbuilding sectors, 
and its marine economy and maritime interests in general. China’s naval developments over the past 
decade have been widely commented on, especially its high-profile purchase of Russian surface, 
submarine and aircraft platforms, its indigenous construction of both conventional and nuclear-powered 
submarines, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s groundbreaking and ongoing deployment of 
an anti-piracy flotilla to the Gulf of Aden. And, in the past year or so, the blogosphere and reputable 
security forums alike have lit up with speculation on the imminent start on the construction of China’s first 
aircraft carrier. 
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China’s maritime strategic agenda
by Chris Rahman
Just what’s China up to at sea? To casual observers, including a burgeoning 
legion of journalists, commentators and bloggers, China seems set on a 
path to becoming a major force on the world’s oceans, developing bluewater 
naval power with which to protect the Chinese state’s expanding economic 
ties to far-flung corners of the world and project political and even strategic 
influence. Such observers rightly note the rapid growth in China’s international 
seaborne trade, its shipping and shipbuilding sectors, and its marine economy 
and maritime interests in general.
China’s naval developments over the past decade have been widely 
commented on, especially its high-profile purchase of Russian surface, 
submarine and aircraft platforms, its indigenous construction of both 
conventional and nuclear-powered submarines, and the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) Navy’s groundbreaking and ongoing deployment of an anti-piracy 
flotilla to the Gulf of Aden. And, in the past year or so, the blogosphere and 
reputable security forums alike have lit up with speculation on the imminent 
start on the construction of China’s first aircraft carrier.
So is China about to assert itself in a global challenge to preponderant US 
sea power? Or is Beijing simply defending its legitimate maritime interests 
in a limited and understandable way as a largely responsible ‘stakeholder’ 
in the international system? What does all this maritime activity amount to in 
strategic terms? China publishes a regular White Paper on defence, but not a 
specific maritime strategy; indeed, it’s not known whether China even has an 
integrated national maritime strategy.
This Policy Analysis makes the following arguments about China’s maritime 
strategic agenda:
1. China has legitimate and growing maritime interests, and increasingly will 
plan to safeguard those interests independently.
2. The PLA Navy aspires to the ability to undertake operations far from 
home, but bluewater capabilities are not the main focus for China’s 
naval development.
3. China’s maritime strategic focus remains on the semi-enclosed and other 
narrow seas of East Asia.
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4. China’s East Asian maritime preoccupations, not its occasional bluewater forays, 
are of greatest strategic significance. They pose direct challenges to the US 
sea-based alliance system and the regional order that the system underpins.
This paper addresses each of these arguments in turn, but the following theme 
permeates it: both the hyperbolic predictions about bluewater expansion and the 
complacent argument about strategically benign naval development miss the 
point—China’s maritime ambitions (and behaviour), even though focused relatively 
close to home, indicate nothing less than a bid for geopolitical pre-eminence in 
East Asia.
Let’s consider the first argument—that China plans to become increasingly 
self-reliant in safeguarding its growing maritime interests. China’s rapid economic 
development has been heavily trade-dependent, driven by a mercantilist approach 
of accumulating large trade surpluses generated by an artificially stimulated 
merchandise export sector, and heavy investment in domestic infrastructure and 
urbanisation. All of this activity requires large inputs of raw resources. China has a 
substantial natural resource base, but it’s been insufficient to fuel industry’s almost 
insatiable demand for supplies of raw materials. Australia has been a primary 
beneficiary of that demand, as has been clearly evident in the iron ore, liquefied 
natural gas, coal and uranium sectors. Of all imported resources, however, oil 
remains the most strategically vital and, like other imported raw materials, it’s 
mostly transported by sea. In the case of oil, this usually means transiting the 
Indian Ocean and a passage through the Malacca Strait from ports of origin in the 
Persian Gulf and West Africa.
China’s dependence on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has led some 
Chinese commentators to speak of a ‘Malacca dilemma’ for the country’s national 
security interests, although the threat of significant disruption to maritime traffic 
through that route seems exaggerated. No less a figure than Chinese President 
Hu Jintao warned in November 2003 of attempts by other major powers to seek 
control of the strait. Given the political sensitivities of the straits states to outside 
interference, that idea is somewhat fanciful and also perhaps misunderstands 
the inherently mobile and flexible nature of naval power: even if one makes the 
assumption that blocking the passage of Chinese shipping through Southeast Asian 
straits could possibly be deemed necessary (or viable) in the future, that would 
hardly require the type of ongoing geopolitical control of the strait alluded to by Hu. 
Any blockade by a rival power can only reasonably be envisaged as a response to 
Chinese aggression elsewhere—against, say, Taiwan, Japan or India—so China’s 
own responsible behaviour may be its best defence against such an eventuality.
Lesser threats to shipping posed by pirates, terrorism or even navigational hazards 
have been at best secondary concerns. Nevertheless, China has begun to play 
its part in international efforts to improve maritime security—for example, by 
signing and ratifying the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), being one of six user states 
to agree to the Cooperative Mechanism for the Malacca and Singapore Straits 
initiated by the International Maritime Organization, and by deploying PLA Navy 
units to patrol the Gulf of Aden. Such activity can be viewed largely as positive 
international engagement and has the compelling advantage of enhancing China’s 
diplomatic aspirations for prestige and respect befitting a great power. Further 
Chinese maritime engagement might be expected, for no great power worthy of the 
name has been willing to entrust important aspects of its security to others for long 
(although Japan has been a notable exception, at least until now). A future Chinese 
aircraft carrier capability would satisfy many of those needs: prestige, SLOC 
security and a symbol of power and resolve for gunboat diplomacy. Aircraft carriers 
would be formidable assets for prosecuting China’s maritime territorial interests, 
especially in the South China Sea.
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Let’s move to the second argument—that bluewater capabilities are not the 
main focus for China’s naval developments. As the PLA Navy’s Indian Ocean 
deployments and increasing naval forays into the Pacific demonstrate, China 
intends to be able to operate more frequently beyond the East Asian littoral 
environment, which is characterised by a number of narrow seas stretching north 
to south adjacent to the Asian continent, ‘semi-enclosed’ by chains of islands. 
But while China’s higher profile oceanic activities are becoming more frequent, 
those activities are more remarkable for their sheer novelty than for any profound 
strategic meaning. This situation may well change in the future, but any review of 
the PLA Navy’s current force structure must reflect the proposition that it hasn’t 
been developed primarily for bluewater operations. For example, although China 
has been building larger, more capable surface combatants with greater range 
and sustainability, it hasn’t been constructing significant numbers of underway 
replenishment ships—even though substantive oceanic deployments by any navy 
require such logistical support capabilities to sustain the mission.
Another clue lies in submarine construction, a naval priority since the mid-1990s. 
Although a new class of nuclear-powered boat (SSN) is now in service, most 
of the submarines inducted into service over the past fifteen years have been 
conventional diesel–electric boats. For all the stealthy attributes that make 
them highly effective sea-denial weapons in littoral warfare, they have limited 
mobility compared to SSNs and surface warships and so are less well suited to 
distant-water operations.
The third argument—that China remains focused on the East Asian maritime 
environment—relates directly to the second. Chinese thinking has to some extent 
been influenced by the idea that to continue to prosper China will need assured 
access to the oceans. But in this view, its access to the Pacific is constrained 
by the first chain of islands currently controlled by hostile or potentially hostile 
powers—particularly Taiwan and Japan, each backed by their American protector. 
Furthermore, access to the Indian Ocean also depends on assured passage 
through the narrow seas and maritime choke points of archipelagic Southeast 
Asia. Along with China’s various maritime territorial and jurisdictional disputes, this 
dilemma has ensured that Beijing’s primary strategic developments over the past 
quarter of a century have focused on the ability to dominate the South China, East 
China and Yellow seas. China’s preoccupation with Taiwan has been both driven by, 
and a driver of, this particular geostrategic agenda.
Fourth, it would be wrong to believe that only an ocean-going Chinese navy is 
strategically significant: the bluewater environment isn’t where the primary threat 
posed by China’s military modernisation lies. Indeed, China’s ambitions to dominate 
regional seas can be viewed simply as Beijing seeking a prerequisite for the 
geopolitical domination of East Asia itself. China’s strategic focus on area-denial 
capabilities since the US intervention during the March 1996 Taiwan Strait missile 
crisis has been intended to degrade US capacity to reinforce its allies and clients 
should conflict erupt, or even to deter intervention in the first place. Those PLA 
capabilities include submarines; mines; sea-, land- and air-launched anti-ship 
cruise missiles; land-based air power increasingly optimised for maritime attack; 
counter-space power; and short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including 
ostensibly a version of the DF-21 ballistic missile designed to attack ships at sea, 
especially the large targets offered by US Navy aircraft carriers. China has slowly 
but surely been ramping up the pressure on Taiwan and Japan through increasingly 
confident and assertive exercises and operations. Even many of China’s operations 
beyond the first chain of islands seem to be aimed at planning for sea-denial 
operations. For example, surveying and mapping activities in parts of the Pacific 
Ocean are most likely designed to plan for submarine operations for potential 
interdiction of US naval forces transiting from Guam, Pearl Harbor or the US Pacific 
west coast.
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China has also aggressively targeted routine US military operations in the region 
for harassment. That targeting caused a potentially serious incident in the South 
China Sea off Hainan in March 2009, when Chinese forces interfered with the 
legitimate operations of the unarmed and civilian-manned ocean surveillance ship, 
USNS Impeccable. The Impeccable is designed to gather underwater acoustic 
data and was operating in an area used by Chinese submarines, including the 
new class of nuclear ballistic missile boats, based at the newly expanded Hainan 
naval base at Sanya on the southern tip of the island. Freedom of navigation 
and operational manoeuvre are essential for the effective functioning of the US 
maritime alliance system in the western Pacific—the only real force for order and 
stability across the region. Moreover, China’s construction of aircraft carriers at 
this point might indicate that it’s now satisfied with the effectiveness of its denial 
capabilities and is embarking on the next stage of naval development—being able 
to project power more widely and to assert its strategic pre-eminence in East Asian 
security calculations.
Some have argued that an essentially stable geostrategic balance exists in East 
Asia, with China dominant on land and the US dominant at sea. However, that 
argument misunderstands the challenge that China’s seaward expansion poses 
to the US system of regional security. Japan and Taiwan, in particular, but also 
many other states, are feeling the pressure. Even US forces, having reinvigorated 
their regional presence and refocused capabilities on littoral operations, are being 
forced to rethink their options in response to growing vulnerabilities to the PLA’s 
anti-access arsenal.
Paradoxically, perhaps, it’s not China’s current limited ability to conduct 
distant-water operations or its potential aircraft carrier development that should be 
a primary cause for concern, notwithstanding the understandable but exaggerated 
fears of India. Rather, it is the PLA’s growing ability to deny access to East Asian 
seas in a crisis or conflict, and so to disrupt the security system led by US Pacific 
Command, that most threatens regional order and harmony at sea.
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